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MODESTO MURO DE LA VEGA*

Transfer of Spanish Securities:
Mediation of a Public Attesting
Officer-Its Significance and Scope
The significance and scope of the provisions of the Decree of September
19, 1936, and of the supplementary Order of February 19, 1941-still in
force-that although due to very special and contingent circumstances.
established the need for mediation by the public attesting officer, in the
transfer of securities, thereby terminating the freedom of transfer that had
existed up to then.
It should be noted that, according to Art. 545 of the Commercial Code,
the mere delivery of a bearer certificate sufficed for the transfer of its
ownership, and that the mediation of a public attesting officer not only had
the effect of making the certificate so transferred non-recoverable, but to
no extent constituted a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the transfer.
It will be useful to reproduce the text of Arts. 1 and 4 of the Decree of
September 19, 1936, which will constitute the basis of the instant study:
Art. 1. It is forbidden to transfer and negotiate public, industrial or
commercial securities without the mediation of stockbrokers, commercial
brokers and ship's interpreters or notaries public, and any transfer or
negotiation carried out as from July 19 last without such mediation shall be
null and void.
Art. 4. Public attesting officers who certify transfers or negotiations of
securities, without having obtained prior evidence of the lawful possession
thereof by the transferor, shall be criminally liable as accessories after the
fact of the offenses committed by the latter, and shall likewise have joint
and several civil liability with the other parties criminally liable.
The Order of February 19, 1941, established the mediation of the public
attesting officer in the placement of securities by the issuing companies
themselves.
*Law Degree, University of Barcelona (1943-47), Excellent Mention; head of the
Barcelona branch of the law firm of J. & A. Garrigues; formerly Legal Counsel-Assistant
Manager in Spanish group of companies of international firm.
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The currency of the Decree of September 19, 1936, and of the Order of
February 19, 1941, is beyond doubt. Reference is made to both provisions
as being in force by the Decree on Current Legislation of December 14,
1951 ; and their currency is expressly recognized in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court to which attention will be called later on. But the question
is not so clear with respect to the scope which the Decree of September
19, 1936, wishes to attribute to the mediation of the public attesting officer.
It is a moot point whether such mediation is an essential element of the
sale contract itself or whether, on the contrary, it is a formality that only
affects the "manner." The question, in the final analysis, is to determine
whether the non-mediation of a public attesting officer in a contract of sale
of securities, entails the absolute nullity of the contract, as contemplated in
Art. 4 of the Civil Code; or whether, on the contrary, the provisions of Art.
1279 of the Code would be applicable, according to which the contract will
be effective between the parties, who may compel one another reciprocally
to comply with the formality of the mediation of a public attesting officer,
in order for the sale contract to be enforceable.
The problem, as noted, has already been discussed by legal commentators, and has given rise to the conflicting opinions of two eminent
authorities, Professors Garrigues and Uria. While Professor Uria, in his
commentaries on the Corporations Act, starting from the distinction between causal contract and transfer, maintains that the Decree of September
19, 1936, requires only the mediation of the public attesting officer for the
actual transfer, but not for the causal or obligational transaction, Professor
Garrigues holds that the Decree imposes a certain formality (the Transfer
Certificate or Public Deed) upon the legal transaction that serves as the
cause or basis of the transfer of bearer securities, and that transfers not
fulfilling this requirement are null and void. Professor Garrigues explains
his position in the following terms:
We must agree with Uria that delivery is in Spanish Law a legal transaction
different from the causal contract that is indispensable in the case of the
transfer of property and property rights. But this cannot lead us to assert that
the Decree of 1936 and the Law of 1940 were intended to declare null and
void, not those legal transactions aimed at transferring the ownership of
bearer securities (sales, exchanges, deliveries in payments, donations, etc.),
but the subsequent transfer that had its origin in such transactions. The
reason is simple: transfer certificates of intermediary agents and notarial
deeds are never confined to certifying the delivery of certain securities but
state the cause of such delivery, precisely because in Spanish Law delivery is
not an abstract but a causal transaction. In these public instruments the
causal contract is inseparably linked to the fact of the delivery and this is
substantiated by Art. 101 of the Commercial Code, according to which
stockbrokers who mediate in sale contracts will be liable to the purchaser for
the delivery of the effects or securities which are the subject of such transacInternational Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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tions, and to the seller for the payment of the agreed price or compensation.
The official printed forms of the transfer ("cash transaction") certificates do
not simply evidence the delivery of the securities but the cause of that
delivery, which is the sale contract (thus the printed form reads: "Nontransferable certificates in favour of the purchaser, .... "). In turn, the Regulations
of the Madrid Stock Exchange, Art. 34, entitle the Stockbroker to demand, in
cash transactions, that the giver of the order shall deliver to him, prior to any
negotiation, the effect covered thereby, or the funds destined for the payment
of the value thereof; this being precisely to enable the Stockbroker himself to
comply with the obligation of delivery incumbent upon the seller under the
sale contract recorded in the transfer certificate. If the formalities established
in the special legislation here under discussion related only to the transfer, it
would be necessary to agree upon the need for the issuance of two certificates, one for the sale contract (for which the official printed forms are
intended), and one for the delivery of the securities (for which the printed
forms will not do, since they quote Art. 101 of the Commercial Code, which
makes the stockbroker responsible for the delivery of the securities, as an act
subsequent in time to the casual contract, which is all that is formally
recorded by the certificate). It was precisely the aim of the special legislation
of 1936, to compel the public attesting officer to make sure of the lawlessness
of the cause of the transfer; hence it follows that this cause cannot be
excluded from the document formally recording the transfer itself. (Treatise
on Commercial Law, Volume 11, Securities. Pages 734 et seq.)

The same question, on exactly the same terms, has been raised in the
Supreme Court of Spain without its being possible to affirm that the
problem has been definitively settled, although we must acknowledge the

prevalence- at least numerically and chronologically- of the jurisprudence
supporting the contention upheld by Professor Uria. We have been able to
find the following Judgments dealing with this question: Judgments of
February 26, 1945, December 19, 1946, Ocober 6, 1956, April 13, 1957,
October 13, 1959, February 26, 1966 and February 4, 1971.

After asserting in the Judgment of February 26, 1945, (A. 265), in
complete disregard of the Decree of September 19,1936, that bearer securities are transferred by mere delivery, and in the Judgment of December
19, 1946 (A. 1411), that in the purchase and sale of shares of a company,

which is not subject by law to any specific formality for its validity, the
agreement is one of purchase and sale and is binding on the parties, in the
Judgment of October 6,1956 (A. 3179), the Supreme Court establishes the
doctrine upheld by Professor Garrigues in the following clear and unequivocal terms:
...in order for a contract of sale of securities to be legally effective, it is not
sufficient that it shall have met the prerequisites of Art. 1261 of the Civil
Code, since in view of the fact that the Decree of September 19, 1936 was in
force, the mediation of a stockholder was inescapably necessary, and the
wording of the precept is so unequivocal that it not only forbids the execution
of such contracts without the said formal prerequisite; so that, the contract
having been executed differently the action contemplated in Art. 4 of the
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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Civil Code became applicable, but expressly declared such transactions carried out as from July 19, 1936, null and void. which clearly indicated that the
legislator attached such importance to the mediation of the public attesting
officer that no subsequent remedying of this omission was allowed; and there
can be no question that it is admissible to distinguish between a meeting of
minds for the purchase and sale of shares (title) and the transfer thereof
(manner), since the underlying purpose of the Decree of September 19, 1936,
was to evidence the ownership of the securities constituting the subject-matter of the transaction and the freedom of the parties to bind themselves, as a safeguard of the lawfulness of the agreement.

But in 1957 the contrary contention again prevailed and it was upheld in
the Judgment of April 13, 1957 (A. 1953), that:
the purchase and sale is consummated by the meeting of minds; that Arts.
51 and 52 of the Commercial Code do not prevent parties who have reached
a consensual agreement from compelling each other to give legal form and
effectiveness to what they have agreed upon; and that the wording of the
Decree of September 19, 1936, supports this doctrine, because it makes
patent its character for the security of property and transactions, without
extending to the requirements essential to the existence of the contract.
...

And in the Judgment of October 13, 1959 (A. 3951) the Supreme Court
defines this doctrine more carefully by stating that
• . . for the correct application of the Decree of September 19, 1936, it is
compulsory to distinguish between conclusion, formal recording and execution or consummation of the contract, and it is obvious that what the aforesaid Decree prohibits, is the execution of the transaction without the mediation of a stockbroker, commercial broker or notary public, who certifies the
transfer on the terms contemplated in Art. 4 of the Decree, that is, requiring
the formal recording thereof through the mediation of such attesting officers.
but this does not prevent, but indeed presupposes, the prior conclusion of the
contract, since it is not reasonable to suppose that when it is not a question
(sic) of using the services of a public attesting officer as a mediator, the
parties are to request his mediation without having previously reached an
agreement as to the transfer of securities or certificates that is to be formally
recorded.

Finally, the Judgment of February 2, 1966 (A. 1534), is of only limited
relevance to the question being examined, since it merely states that:
...in order for the delivery of shares to be effective, and to entail the transfer
of the ownership thereof, their physical delivery is not sufficient, but compliance with the requirements for stock exchange contracts laid down in the
provisions in force is necessary..

The recent Judgment of February 4, 1971 (A. 531) defined the juriprudential doctrine on the following terms:
... the purchase and sale of securities involves, in Spanish Law, according
to the Judgment of March 7, 1925, two entirely distinct moments: one, the
conclusion of the contract, the effectiveness of which for the parties who have
entered into it does not depend upon the presence of an officer or mediator of
any kind (Art. 74 of the Code of Commerce); and two, the performance

International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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thereof or transfer of the shares sold. which although generally took place by
the mere delivery of the document (Art. 545 (2) of the Commercial Code)
later on, as from the promulgation of Art. 1 of the Decree of September
19,1936, declared in force by Art. 1 (4), paragraph (A), of the Law of
December 14, 1951, and Art. 3 of the Law of February 23, 1940, required for
this purpose the mediation of a stockbroker, or a commercial broker, so much
so indeed that the absence of this prerequisite ad solemnitatem not only
deprives the transaction of the non-recoverability which is otherwise attributed to it by Art. 545 (3) of the Commercial Code, but makes it radically null
and void, pursuant to the literal wording of the precept, although this penalty,
as a result of its exceptional nature, does not extend to the contract which
served as the precedent for the transfer and which, according to Judgments of'
December 19, 1946, April 13, 1957, and October 13, 1959, is fully effective
between the parties who entered into the same and their heirs (Art. 1257 of
the Civil Code), who may reciprocally compel one another to execute it
formally.

And later on it is added:
... apart from the fact that, if this were not so, and the contrary solution
were adopted, the same conclusion would be reached, because the transfer of
the effect in dispute was carried out, in the case here under consideration, by
means of a transfer certificate issued by a stockbroker on July 12 and
October 7, 1966, without such stockbroker who is only obligated in cases
such as this to make sure of the legitimacy of the signatures of the parties
(Art. 95 of the Commercial Code), or the person to whom the seller had
entrusted the performance of the contract, being aware at that time of the
previous decease of the holder of the shares, and without any bad faith being
observable on the part of the purchaser..

It may thus be seen that, although mentioning it, the Spanish Supreme
Court again ignores fundamental aspects of the Decree of September 19,
1936, such as the obligation of the public attesting officer to make certain
not only of the legitimacy of the signature, but of the lawful possession of
the transferor of the securities.
It will undoubtedly be considered rash, in light of the most recent
doctrine of the Supreme Court which has just been cited, to repeat the
assertion made at the outset, to the effect that one may not consider the
question as entirely resolved. As long as the Decree of September 19,
1936, remains in force, then in accordance with its terms the conclusion

that must necessarily follow, is to consider the mediation of the public
attesting officer as an essential prerequisite of the purchase and sale transaction, to such an extent that, in default of such mediation, the transaction
becomes radicallynull and void, as specified by the Supreme Court itself in
its latest Judgment of February 4, 1971, pursuant to the literal wording of
the precept, although the Supreme Court qualifies the scope of this precept,
in view of its exceptional nature, by excluding from nullity the contract
which served as the precedentfor the transfer.

All prohibitive Laws are, by their very nature, exceptional. And it is
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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obvious that while they subsist they must be respected in accordance with
the terms in which they were pronounced. There is no limiting of their
scope on the pretext of their exceptional nature, because the precept itself
was precisely the result of de facto circumstances of an exceptional nature.
If one is to be consistent with the origin of this legal precept, one can only
admit the following alternatives: either the precept is amended or repealed,
because it is felt that the exceptional de facto circumstances that required it
have changed or have ceased to exist; or the precept is respected to its full
extent; and this entails the mediation of a public attesting officer as an
essential prerequisite of the transaction of purchase and sale, both with
respect to the transfer itself (manner) and with respect to the meeting of
minds (title).
This position was clearly set forth in the Judgment of October 6, 1956,
which is moreover shared by the Central Economic-Administrative Court
in its Resolution of February 16, 1954 (A. 803), when it claims to see the
justification of the non-taxability of the transfer of shares in a private
document in the civil and mercantile nullity of the transfer. It is this
reasoning, and the contents of the most recent Judgment of February 4,
1971, (to recall the last part cited, in which, as if wishing to reassure
itself-may it be said with respect for the Spanish Supreme Court of
Justice-the Supreme Courts asserts: even though the contrary solution
were adopted, the same conclusion would be reached), which leads one to
consider the question as still open.
It would not be at all surprising if a return were made to the position
upheld in the Judgment of October 6, 1956. However, it must be quite
clear that, at the present time, in view of the repeated and most recent
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the question under consideration must
be settled, to the effect that the mediation of a public attesting officer in a
transaction of purchase and sale of securities will only be necessary for the
formal execution or consummation of the contract, which will be binding
on the parties and their successors in interest as soon as the essential
requirements for its validity are met (Art. 1261 of the Civil Code).
Furthermore, a contract entered into without the mediation of a public
attesting officer will be binding upon the parties and their successors in
interest, who will have an action to compel each other reciprocally to
comply with the prerequisite laid down by the Decree of September 19,
1936, namely, the formal execution of the transaction in the presence of a
public attesting officer, in order for the transfer of the securities to be
consummated and, accordingly, to become effective as to third parties.
This is the solution that is mandatory in view of the most recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and one must abide by this in the comments
that follow.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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One would be overstepping the proper limits to impose upon this study,
if one considered the different situations-which are certainly fascinating-to which the jurisprudential doctrine which has just been examined
may lead, within the field of the complex rights and obligations inherent in
securities, especially as regards the relations between the parties to private
sale contract themselves, and vis-A-vis third parties, among which must be
included the company issuing the securities and the other shareholders.
Influence of a Foreign Element

Having defined the most recent doctrine of the Supreme Court, one must
now examine a case that is very important, owing to the frequency with
which it occurs in practice, as a result of the increase in foreign investments in Spain, following the de-control which began with the Decree-Law of the Headship of State of July 27, 1959. Although, strictly
speaking, this case does not necessarily require the presence of a foreign
personal element, since it is a consequence of the place in which the act is
carried out rather than of the nationality of the persons participating therein, one may affirm that in the great majority of cases the transferor and the
acquirer are foreigners resident abroad.
Reference is made to be precise, to the purchaser and sale of securities
abroad-fundamentally shares-issued by Spanish companies. Now it is
possible to ask whether in such cases, the mediation of a Spanish public
attesting officer is necessary on the same terms as we have examined for a
sale carried out in Spain.
One may not neglect the fact that, at the present time, it is the general
practice purely and simply to admit the validity of transfers carried out
abroad in accordance with the formalities of the country in which the
transfer is effected and that the current concern of Spanish public attesting
officers is confined to obtaining, with more or less difficulty and more or
less strictly, evidence of such transfer, when the person who acquired the
securities abroad later intends to transfer them in Spain.
Precisely in order to avoid such difficulties in a possible future transfer,
the mediation of a Spanish attesting officer is usually recommended, but for
the sole purpose of recording or reflecting in the Certificate of Cash
Transactions ("P61iza de operaciones al contado"), the transfer already
carried out abroad in accordance with local law, although documentarily
the Certificate does not reflect the true circumstances of the transaction. It
is only in his communication to the Foreign Investment Statistics Office,
that the attesting officer mentions the fact that the transaction has been
carried out abroad.
It is clear that, in the field of foreign investment legislation, the Order of
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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March 15, 1962, governing the acquisition by foreigners or Spaniards
resident abroad, of securities previously issued by Spanish companies,
implicity admits the validity of transfers between foreigners or Spaniards
habitually resident abroad carried out and settled directly abroad in foreign
currency, that is to say, presumably without the mediation of a Spanish
public attesting officer; and the I.E.M.E., 1 for its part, has recognized the
validity of such transfers.
It must be asked, however, to what extent this practice, covered, as has
been seen, by a legal provision and by the action of the official Exchange
Control Authorities, is in accord with the situation created by the Decree
of September 19, 1936, and with the doctrine of the Supreme Court in
connection with that Decree. In the final analysis, it is a question of
determining whether the International private-law rule of locus regis acturn, according to which the lex loci will be applied to determine the formal
prerequisites of legal acts, should prevail over the Decree of September 19,
1936, or whether on the contrary, this Decree should constitute an exception to the rule.
The rule locus regis actum is established as a norm of Spanish private
international law in Art. 11 of the Civil Code, the text of which reads as
follows:
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. Where the above acts are authorized by Spanish diplomatic or
consular functionaries abroad, the solemnities established by Spanish laws
shall be observed in the execution thereof. The provisions of this article
and of the preceding article notwithstanding, the prohibitive laws relative
to persons, their acts or their property, and those relating to public order
and good customs, shall not be annulled by laws or judgments issued, or
provisions or agreements entered into, in a foreign country.
This is not the place, nor does the author consider himself qualified, to
make a thorough study of the concept of public order; of whether or not
there is a concept of international public order that is different from
internal public order; of whether or not such a distinction may have true
practical significance; of whether, in short, prohibitive laws form an integral part of the concept of public order or are independent thereof. The
fact which is unquestionable is that, regardless of the doctrinal position
adopted within the field of Spanish Private International Law, the Decree
of September 19, 1936, a prohibitive law by any standard, even indeed
with a certain penal character (see Art. 4), comes fully within the reference
ISpanish Foreign Exchange Institute.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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to such laws contained in paragraph three of Art. 11 of the Spanish Civil
Code, and consequently cannot be annulled by... agreements entered into
in foreign countries.

And it does not seem possible to accept as valid the claim that the
considerations of public order which gave rise to this Decree have fundamentally changed. Such a claim may be refuted by replying that, if the
legal prohibition is maintained, it must be because the reasons which
caused it to be enacted have not entirely disappeared and that, in any
event, as long as it is maintained it must be respected. Accordingly, the
mediation of a public attesting officer cannot be avoided, even if the
transaction is carried out abroad.
However, as has been seen above, the most recent doctrine of the
Spanish Supreme Court, lays down that the mediation of the public attesting officer extends only to the manner and not to the title. An agreement
entered into abroad with the formalities of the lex loci, will therefore be
valid and effective between the parties and their successors and the mediation of a Spanish public officer will only be necessary for the execution,
consummation or formal recording of the purchase, that is to say, in order
for the transaction to be effective as to third parties.
Would it be admissible, in view of the above arguments, to consider as
fulfilled by the mediation of a foreign public functionary, the requirement
established by the Decree of September 19, 1936, by deeming foreign
public functionaries to be included among the attesting officers referred to
in that Decree? Such a comparison seems clearly not to be possible. The
concept of public functionary falls entirely within the scope of the Public
Law of each State, which has sovereign authority to determine the concept,
and to lay down the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to hold
such status, as well as to establish his competency and the scope of his
authority. As Verplaetse states, in his treatise InternationalPrivate Law:
• . . the Public Law of individual States has no place in the system of
International Private Law, a fact that of itself, is proved by the universal
acceptance of the application of the lexfori as regards procedure.
There should be no doubt that the compulsory mediation imposed by the
Decree of September 19, 1936 is that of Spanish functionaries who, in

accordance with the requirements laid down by Spanish law, hold the
status of stockbrokers, commercial brokers, interpreters of vessels or no-

taries public. This is confirmed, if there should be any need for such
confirmation, by Art. 3 of the Law of February 23, 1940, which clarifies
that the commercial brokers mentioned in Art. 1 of the Decree of September 19, 1936, are registered commercial brokers holding an official diploma.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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Having established the foregoing, one has no alternative but to consider
as defective the above-mentioned practice which the Spanish attesting
officer confines himself to documenting a transaction entered into and
settled abroad, although, as has been said, in the light of the transfer
Certificate ("P61iza") the transaction appears to be a normal transaction
and must entail all the consequences thereof, the most important being the
non-recoverability of the securities. This must be considered as a defective
practice because, regardless of the actual point in time of the legal transaction at which the Spanish attesting officer mediates, he has the duty of
ensuring the lawful acquisition and legitimate possession, by the transferor,
of the securities transferred, and the Decree of September 19, 1936, even
goes so far as to make him criminally liable as an accessory to the offenses
which the transferors may have committed.
This duty is not considered to have been fulfilled when the above
practice is followed. It is our opinion that a proper formalization of the
transfer is required in the same way as if the execution of a contract
concluded in Spain were involved, for which purpose the fact that the
transferor and the acquirer are out of the country is no obstacle, since they
can avail themselves of proxies.
It is, however, necessary to allow exceptions to the compulsory mediation of a Spanish public attesting officer in the transfer or placement of
Spanish securities. Reference is made to the case in which subject to the
prior express authorization of the Spanish Government, Spanish securities
are listed on foreign exchanges. Merely from reading the daily press one
learns that certain Spanish securities are quoted on foreign stock exchanges (Banco Hispano Americano, Estac and Banco Central, on the
London Stock Exchange; Phenix Espafiol on the Paris Stock Exchange
and Sevillana de Electricidad and Espac on the Zurich Stock Exchange).
Section 35 of the Tariff of the General Tax on Transfers and Legal
Documents refers indirectly to this case.
Another exception that should be noted is the issuance abroad of Spanish securities, expressly authorized by the Spanish Government by virtue
of special legal provisions (see, for instance, the Order of July 22, 1966.
Base 4. "Imposing upon the concessionary for the construction and operation of certain toll motorways the obligation of resorting to foreign credit.
And establishing the compulsory intervention of the Spanish Government
to regulate the issuance of bonds or similar securities, when the concessionary obtains foreign credit by the issuance of such securities").
There can be no doubt that these cases constitute exceptions to the general
system, which we have examined, laid down by the Decree of September
19, 1936.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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Fiscal Aspect
The transfer of shares, which in the final analysis is of principal concern
in this article, is subject to Transfer Tax at the rate of 2 percent when the
transfer is not certified by a stockbroker or an official commercial broker,
and according to a scale, the rate of which is practically 0.5 percent in the
case of transactions worth more than 1.000.000 Pesetas, when the transfer
is carried out through such a broker. In the latter case, a commission of
0.25 percent is also payable, as a general rule, by each of the parties.
It is of interest, first of all, to try and clarify the question of the accrual
of the tax, a question that would be unimportant if the transfer of securities
without the mediation of a public attesting officer were radically null and
void. However, as noted, such is not the conclusion to be drawn from the
most recent jurisprudence of the Spanish Supreme Court, but rather that
the private transfer contract is complete and only requires, in order to be
effective erga omnes, to be signed, consummated or executed with the
mediation of such an attesting officer.
The Spanish Supreme Court had occasion to examine this fiscal aspect
of the problem in its Judgment of October 13, 1959, when it asserted,
contrary to the contention of the appellant based on a supposed infringement of Art. 119 of the 1932 Stamp Tax Law.and Arts. 34 of the
Law and 186 of the Regulations of the then current Transfer Tax, as a
result of the admittance in Court of a document bearing no stampage or
annotation of having paid the Transfer Tax or of being exempt therefrom,
that the obligations relative to tax assessment must be complied with at the
time of execution of the contract, that is, when it is certified by a public
attesting officer. But this declaration of the Supreme Court, which might
have been valid under the repealed Stamp Tax Law, today lacks validity,
as this tax on the transfer of shares has become part, not of the Tax on
Legal Documents, but of the Tax on Transfers.
Thus, while, in the former case, the tax accrues at such time as the
taxable act is formally executed (Art. 106, Revised Text), in transfers inter
vivos the Tax becomes due on the date on which the act or contract subject
thereto takes place (Art. 73, Revised Text). The phrase "takes place,"
lacking any technical legal significance, must be understood to refer, in the
case under consideration, to the time of consummation of the contract of
transfer; that is to say, and according once again to the concededly correct
jurisprudential doctrine, to the date of the private contract of transfer,
where this precedes the execution of the transfer before a public attesting
officer.
However, the Central Economic Administrative Court has declared, in
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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its Resolution of February 16, 1954, that the transfer of shares in a private
document is not subject to what was then known as the "Derechos Reales"
and Property Transfer Tax, on the ground that, although Art. 24 of the
Regulations governing such Tax (still in force insofar as they do not
conflict with the Revised Text of April 6, 1967) makes liable to taxation,
all transfers by contract of movable property, or rights legally considered
as such, it is nonetheless true that this precept contains an express exception: and does not expressly appear in any other provision of these
Regulations. The fact is that Art. 48(2) of these Regulations requires, for
the exaction of tax on the transfer of shares or bonds of companies, the
existence of a public deed or judicial or administrative document, which
requirement is confirmed by Art. 20(6) of the same Regulations, as well as
by Section 59 of the Tariff then in force.
And the Supreme Court has itself affirmed (Judgments of March 9 and
12, 1951; March 23 and April 13, 1953; February 11, 1954):
The general rule contained in Art. 48 of the Tax Regulations, regarding the
nature of the documents in which the acts are recorded, cannot be understood
in such absolute terms as not to allow an exception to be made of those cases
in which other legal provisions with which such general rules must be reconciled requires a specific formality and, consequently, if Arts. 34 et seq. of the
Statue of Tax Collection require a public deed, it will be necessary to wait
until the execution of that deed before exacting the tax.
To what extent can this position as regards taxation be made to tally
with the most recent doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court, which considers the transfer of shares by private contract as perfect? How far is the
situation altered by the current Revised Text of the Transfer and Legal
Documents Tax, Arts. 3 and 54 of which establish the limits of the tax
very generally and the tariff of which (Sections 9 and 10) now omits any
reference to public deeds and judicial or administrative documents, Section
9 appearing indeed to cover any transfer of shares not certified by stockbrokers or by official commercial brokers? One must simply confine oneself to leaving open this question, which lies outside the main objective of
this paper.
Let us here consider, too, the case of a transfer, or assumed transfer,
abroad, which has been examined earlier. Let us remember that, in the vast
majority of cases, it is for tax reasons that the transfer is carried out
abroad, in the belief that in this case the Spanish tax is not applicable.
However the application of Transfer Tax to transfers of shares carried out
abroad is justified by the following precepts:
Revised Text of April 6, 1967:
"Art. 3 (2). The Tax shall be exacted:
"(a) On transfer inter vivos of all manners of property located in SpanInternational Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
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ish territory and of rights, actions and obligations that have arisen, may be
exercised or are to be performed therein, as well as on transfers of movable
property located outside such territory when the acquirer and transferor
are Spanish nationals or resident in Spain. .
Regulations of January 15, 1959:
"Art. 4 (1). In transfers, by any title, of movable property belonging to
foreigners, and in transfers of such property to foreigners, when the property in both cases is located or is considered to be located in Spanish
territory, even if deposited in the possession of foreign companies, entities
or individuals or domiciled in exempt territory, the Tax shall be levied,
unless tax exemption has been expressly covenanted with the country in
question....
Art. 1 (3). The following shall be considered as located in Spanish
territory: ...
"(4) Rights, actions and obligations that have arisen, may be exercised
or are to be performed in territory subject to the tax or by authorities
established in the same territory."
Accordingly, the application of the tax will be compulsory in transfers of
shares abroad, both if they are considered as movable property and if they
are considered as an aggregate of rights, actions and obligations of the
lawful owner thereof. It should be added that the reference to international
agreements contained in Art. 4 of the Transfer Tax Regulations is of no
significance, since the agreements for the avoidance of double taxation
between Spain and a number of other countries are not applicable to
Transfer Taxes, although they are applicable to Inheritance Taxes.
Conceding the continued affectiveness of the Decree of September 19,
1936, over the rule locus regit actum, the same question regarding the
application of the Transfer Tax to the private transfer contract entered into
in Spain will be applicable with respect to the contract entered into abroad;
although, however, we must make the proviso that the practice which is
then considered defective, consisting of reflecting or documenting in a
Transfer Certificate ("P6liza"), issued by a Spanish stockbroker, the transaction considered as already formally executed abroad, will have full tax
consequences in this country, according to the principle that the tax shall
be levied on the same act and for the same concept once only.
And if, contrary to our opinion, it is considered that the rule locus regit
actum must prevail over the Decree of September 19, 1936, and that
consequently the transfer carried out abroad is perfect and binding erga
omnes, then we will have to conclude that the Spanish Tax will be applicable at the rate of 2 percent in acccordance with Section 9 of the
current Tariff.
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A very interesting problem, too, that is closely linked to the above, is
that relative to the lapsing of the tax. It may be thought that the transfer
carried out abroad, being difficult to control for the Spanish Tax Authorities, will easily escape the application of the tax by virtue of the operation
of the Statute of Limitations. This assumption is, actually, equally deceptive. It must not be forgotten that the transfer will have been carried out
(except in the unlikely event if its having been certified by a Spanish
diplomatic agent) in a private document and that, consequently, the lapsing
will not commence to be reckoned to the detriment of the Spanish Treasury until any of the cases contemplated in Art. 133 of the Revised Text
have been fulfilled; that is to say, from the moment it is submitted for tax
assessment, or from the moment it is incorporated or entered in a Public
Register, or from the moment it is delivered, by reason of his attributions,
to a public functionary (as will be seen, for the purposes of this tax another
of the instances contemplated by Art. 1227 of the Civil Code, determining
the certainty of the date of a private document, namely, the death of either
of the parties, is not admitted).
Here the same question may be raised as when the public attesting
officers mentioned by the Decree of September 19, 1936 were being
discussed: will delivery to a foreign public functionary, or registration at a
foreign Public Registry, determine the certainty of the date of a private
document? The answer must be equally negative, for the same reason as
given at that point the Public Law character of the provisions governing
the notion of public functionary and public registry. In support of this
interpretation we may cite the Resolution of the Central Economic Administrative Tribunal of May 30, 1950.
These registries and functionaries referred to in paragraph 2 of Art. 143
of the Transfer Tax Regulations, which was the immediate precedent of
Art. 133 of the current Revised Text, provide that the documents must be
Spanish, the effectiveness of the submittal of the document to an English
Consulate being refused. If the document is delivered to a Spanish diplomatic agent for the purpose of legalization, for example, such intervention,
involving a Spanish public functionary who would be acting by reason of
his office, will indeed lend certainty to the date of the document, and the
lapsing of the tax liability will commence to be reckoned as from then.
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